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In spatial evolutionary games the payoff matrices are used to describe pair interactions among neighboring
players located on a lattice. Now we introduce a way how the payoff matrices can be built up as a sum of payoff
components reflecting basic symmetries. For the two-strategy games this decomposition reproduces interactions
characteristic to the Ising model. For the three-strategy symmetric games the Fourier components can be classified
into four types representing games with self-dependent and cross-dependent payoffs, variants of three-strategy
coordinations, and the rock-scissors-paper (RSP) game. In the absence of the RSP component the game is a
potential game. The resultant potential matrix has been evaluated. The general features of these systems are
analyzed when the game is expressed by the linear combinations of these components.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In many evolutionary games the pair interactions among
the players are defined by payoff matrices [1–4]. In these
models the players are located on the sites of a lattice or
graph and they play two-person games with all their neighbors
(to accumulate income or fitness) when using one of their
possible strategies or states permitted in the system [5,6].
For the simplest models both the players and games are
equivalent and this fact implies the straightforward application
of the methods developed within the statistical physics for
the investigation of many-particle systems. The different
approaches and approximative methods can be exploited
particularly for the so-called potential games [7,8] because
these systems develop into the Boltzmann distribution for
suitable dynamical rules [9,10] that define how the players
can change their own strategy during the evolutionary process.
The intimate relationship between physical models and the
evolutionary potential games implies the direct adoption of
methods and results for the analysis of living systems studied
in biology [11] and social sciences [12–14].
Up to now the exhaustive and systematic analysis of
these systems are prevented by the huge freedom realized by
the large number of parameters quantifying the interactions
(games), dynamical rules, and connectivity structures. For
the sake of simplicity now our investigations are restricted to
lattice models by assuming that the players are distributed on
the sites of a square lattice and their payoffs are collected from
four symmetric two- or three-strategy games that they play
with their nearest neighbors. Additionally we assume that the
players use identical dynamical rule to modify their strategy
with a myopic purpose of increasing their own income. More
precisely, for the two-strategy systems, the dynamical rule is
similar to those suggested by Glauber [15] for the investigation
of the kinetic Ising model [16,17].
The similarity between the Ising model and the mentioned
two-strategy evolutionary games has motivated us to separate
the payoff matrix into components that have proper symme-
tries and application in physical systems. This idea will be
illustrated in Sec. III. The latter approach is extended in the
next section where the 3 × 3 payoff matrix is decomposed into
its two-dimensional Fourier components. The general features
of the spatial models when the games or interactions are
defined by one or two components will be discussed in Sec. V.
Section VI illustrates different variants of coordination games
that exhibit an order-disorder phase transition analogous to that
found for the three-state Potts model [18,19]). First, however,
we define the framework and formalism in the following
section.
II. EVOLUTIONARY GAMES ON LATTICE
We consider systems with equivalent players who are
residing on the sites x of a square lattice consisting of N sites.
The translation invariance is ensured by periodic boundary
conditions whereas the sites are labeled x = 1, . . . ,N . Each
player x chooses one of the Q pure strategies denoted by
Q-dimensional unit vectors as
sx =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
1
0
.
.
.
0
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ ,
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
0
1
.
.
.
0
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ , . . . ,
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
0
.
.
.
0
1
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ . (1)
Additionally, the strategy of the player x will be labeled by
an integer sx = 1, . . . ,Q and the set S = (s1, . . . ,sN ) of the
individual strategies defines the microscopic state (or strategy
profile in the terminology of game theory) of the whole system.
In the present model, the income of player x comes from games
she plays with her four neighbors; that is, the accumulated
payoff ux(sx) can be expressed as
ux(sx) =
∑
δx
sx · Asx+δx , (2)
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where the summation runs over the four nearest-neighbor sites
x + δx . The Ajk (j,k = 1, . . . ,Q) element of the payoff matrix
A defines the income for player x if she chooses her j th
strategy whereas the opponent selects the kth pure strategy.
For symmetric games the interacting players x and y receive
payoffs sx · Asy and sy · Asx , respectively.
An important class of games, known as potential games,
plays a crucial role in the study of evolutionary games in
general. Potential games are defined by the existence of a
potential value assigned to each strategy profile (sx,sy). This
potential value has the property that, if one player unilaterally
changes strategy, the resulting change in potential equals the
change in that players payoff [7]. Thus the change in potential
quantifies the incentive for each player to change strategy. For
a symmetric two-person game (defined by A) the potential, if
it exists, can be described by a symmetric potential matrix V
that satisfies the following condition:
sx · Asy − s′x · Asy = sx · Vsy − s′x · Vsy, (3)
for any pure strategies denoted by the vectors sx , s′x , and sy . The
existence of potential involves that the sum of payoff variations
[given by Eq. (3)] is zero along any closed loops within the
space of strategy profiles and V is unique up to the addition of a
constant. Furthermore, if the payoff matrix is symmetric; that
is, A = A+ (A+ indicates the transpose of A), then V = A.
It is also known that, for the two-strategy symmetric matrix
games the potential matrix exists and symmetric, i.e., V = V+
[7,20]. Additionally, if a multi-player game is built up from
two-player potential games then the potential for the whole
system can be defined as a suitable sum of the pair potentials.
Consequently, in the present lattice model the potential for any
strategy profile s is given by the following expression:
U (S) = 1
2
∑
x,δx
sx · Vsx+δx ; (4)
that is, a scalar function of the strategy profile s. If only a single
player modifies her strategy from sx to s ′x then the variation
of U (s) is equivalent to the payoff variation of the given
player x.
In the present systems we assume that, during the evo-
lutionary process, randomly chosen players are allowed
consecutively to choose another strategy in order to receive
higher payoff. More precisely, within an elementary step of
the evolutionary process player x can modify her strategy to
s ′x with a probability
w(s ′x) =
eux (s
′
x )/K∑
sx
eux (sx )/K
(5)
favoring exponentially the strategy that provides the highest
individual payoff. According to this so-called logit rule [9,21–
23] the choice of the new strategy is independent of the initial
state and it ensures a “local” Boltzmann distribution [24] in
the individual strategy distribution for the given player at a
quenched neighborhood. For this transition rule K measures
the magnitude of the noise or the uncertainties in the stochastic
decision procedure. It is emphasized that for Q = 2 this rule
is equivalent to the probability of spin reversal suggested by
Glauber [15] for the analysis of the kinetic Ising model where
K denotes the temperature.
Blume [9,10] has shown that these systems evolve into
the Boltzmann distribution where the probability of the
microscopic state s is given as
p(S) = 1
Z
eU (S)/K (6)
if the normalization is provided by
Z =
∑
s
eU (S)/K, (7)
where the summation runs over all possible microscopic states
s. The latter feature implies the straightforward application
of the results of statistical physics (including the problem of
ergodicity for large systems at low noise levels [25]) when
studying the macroscopic behavior of evolutionary games.
In order to explore the general features of these lattice
systems for the given components we have performed Monte
Carlo (MC) simulations. These MC simulations are used for
displaying the spatial strategy arrangements for several types
of games. For the quantitative analysis the strategy frequencies
are determined when varying the noise level K . In most of
the cases the relative statistical error is smaller than 1% due
to the large system sizes (N is varied from 105 to 2 × 106)
and sufficiently long run times. In the close vicinity of the
critical transitions the thermalization and sampling times have
exceeded 106 Monte Carlo step (MCS) (during 1 MCS each
player has a chance once on average to modify her strategy).
III. DECOMPOSITION OF 2× 2 GAMES
In this section we briefly illustrate the idea of decomposition
that can be considered as a method for the anatomy of games.
Accordingly, the payoff matrix of a symmetric 2 × 2 game can
be written as
A =
(
A11 A12
A21 A22
)
= A11
(
1 0
0 0
)
+ A12
(
0 1
0 0
)
+A21
(
0 0
1 0
)
+ A22
(
0 0
0 1
)
, (8)
where the four matrices represent orthonormal basis vectors
of a four-dimensional parameter space. Instead of the above
natural basis “vectors” one can choose another set of the
orthonormal basis vectors that reflects the inherent symmetries
of the payoff matrices. For example, A may be written as
A =
4∑
n=1
α(n)f(n), (9)
where the matrices f(n) (n = 1, . . . ,4) define new orthonormal
basis vectors that can be chosen as
f(1) = 1
2
(
1 1
1 1
)
, f(2) = 1
2
(
1 −1
1 −1
)
,
(10)
f(3) = 1
2
(
1 1
−1 −1
)
, f(4) = 1
2
(
1 −1
−1 1
)
.
The above matrices satisfy the conditions of orthogonality and
normalization as
2∑
j,k=1
fjk(n)fjk(m) = δnm, (11)
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where n,m = 1, . . . ,4 and δnm denotes the Kronecker’s delta
function (δnm = 1 if n = m, otherwise δnm = 0). For this
orthonormal set of the basis vectors the coefficients α(n) in
Eq. (9) are given as
α(n) =
2∑
j,k=1
Ajkfjk(n). (12)
In this notation the first term corresponds to the average
portion of payoffs. For most of the traditional and evolutionary
games this constant term does not influence the individual
choices. The first and second components together define
the so-called cross-dependent part of payoffs that can only
be influenced by the co-player(s). For such a type of payoff
there is no direct interactions between the selfish and rational
players for the noncooperative games. This type of interaction,
however, becomes relevant for the so-called cooperative games
when the players are allowed to collaborate with each other,
as well as for evolutionary games when the strategy update is
based on imitation [26]. The latter situations occur for games
where α(3) = α(4) = 0.
On the contrary, the third term f(3) together with f(1)
define self-dependent payoffs that are independent of the
other’s choice. In that case both selfish players can easily
maximize her own payoff in parallel. Notice that the direct
interactions between the players are missing for logit type
(myopic) strategy updates if α(4) = 0. The direct interaction
between the players are described by f(4) which is equivalent
to the coordination game. More precisely, A = α(4)f(4) is a
coordination (anticoordination) game for α(4) > 0 [α(4) < 0].
For the terminology of magnetic Ising model [17,20]
the fourth component f(4) describes the pair interaction
between two equivalent neighboring spins that can be oriented
“upward” or “downward.” The corresponding coefficient
α(4) defines the strength of interaction (coupling constant)
favoring either ferromagnetic [α(4) > 0] or antiferromagnetic
[α(4) < 0] spin arrangements. On the other hand, the effect
of the external magnetic field is similar to the self-dependent
components.
Due to the linear relationship between the potential and
payoff matrices [see Eq. (3)] the potential matrix V can also
be decomposed into a sum as
V =
∑
n
α(n)v(n), (13)
where v(n) is the potential for the pair interaction defined by
the payoff matrix A = f(n), if it exists. For the evaluation
of the corresponding potential components one can exploit
the symmetries. Namely, for the cross-dependent components
v(1) = v(2) = 0 as the payoff of player x is modified by
herself when choosing another strategy. Additionally, one can
easily check that, for the third component, the potential matrix
can be given as v(3) = f(3) + f+(3). Furthermore, v(4) = f(4)
because it is a symmetric matrix. Consequently, the potential
matrix exist for all the symmetric 2 × 2 matrix games and
the corresponding potential depends only on two components,
namely,
V = α(3)[f(3) + f+(3)] + α(4)f(4). (14)
Evidently, there are many other possibilities for choosing
an adequate set of basis vectors. The above choice is motivated
by the intimate analogy between the symmetric 2 × 2 matrix
games and Ising models. On the one hand, the large number
of possibilities (particulary for Q > 2) provides additional
points of view for the anatomy of games. On the other hand,
this freedom in the selection is accompanied with difficulties
related to the absence of additional criteria supporting an
optimal choice. In the next section we suggest a way that
seems to be convenient for Q = 3.
IV. FOURIER DECOMPOSITION OF 3× 3 GAMES
The Fourier decomposition of the Q × Q payoff matrix is
based on the analogy when the payoffs Ajk are considered
as one-dimensional displacements of atoms at the sites
(j,k) (j,k = 1, . . . ,Q) forming a Q × Q square lattice with
periodic boundary conditions. In the literature of solid state
theory (for recent textbooks see Refs. [27,28]) the atomic
displacements are usually decomposed into two-dimensional
Fourier components that are defined by the real and imaginary
parts of the following complex functions:
ϕjk = e
2iπ
Q
(jp+kq)
, (15)
where i is the imaginary unit, p and q (p,q = −1,0,+1 for
Q = 3) characterize the horizontal and vertical wave numbers.
Accordingly, the Fourier components of the payoffs Ajk are
given as the real and imaginary parts of ϕjk . The readers
can recognize that the previous basis vectors (11) can also
be considered as suitable Fourier components for Q = 2.
For sake of simplicity henceforth our investigation is
restricted to the case of Q = 3 and the corresponding Fourier
components g(n) are labeled by a single number n = 1, . . . ,9.
The resultant nine components obey the following forms:
g(1) = 1
3
⎛
⎝1 1 11 1 1
1 1 1
⎞
⎠ , (16)
g(2) = 1√
18
⎛
⎝−1 −1 2−1 −1 2
−1 −1 2
⎞
⎠ , (17)
g(3) = 1√
6
⎛
⎝1 −1 01 −1 0
1 −1 0
⎞
⎠ , (18)
g(4) = 1√
18
⎛
⎝ −1 −1 −1−1 −1 −1
2 2 2
⎞
⎠ , (19)
g(5) = 1√
6
⎛
⎝ 1 1 1−1 −1 −1
0 0 0
⎞
⎠ , (20)
g(6) = 1√
18
⎛
⎝−1 2 −12 −1 −1
−1 −1 2
⎞
⎠ , (21)
g(7) = 1√
6
⎛
⎝−1 0 10 1 −1
1 −1 0
⎞
⎠ , (22)
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g(8) = 1√
18
⎛
⎝ 2 −1 −1−1 2 −1
−1 −1 2
⎞
⎠ , (23)
g(9) = 1√
6
⎛
⎝ 0 −1 11 0 −1
−1 1 0
⎞
⎠ , (24)
where the prefactors are chosen to satisfy the orthonormal
conditions analogous to those given by Eq. (11). Using this set
of basis vectors each 3 × 3 payoff matrix can be expressed as
A =
9∑
n=1
β(n)g(n), (25)
where
β(n) =
3∑
j,k=1
Ajkgjk(n). (26)
Notice that the first component gives a constant contribution
to the payoff; therefore, it is an irrelevant term for most of
the dynamical rules. The components g(2) and g(3) consist
of uniform columns, therefore, these terms do not motivate
the rational players to choose another strategy, thus these
terms give zero contribution to the potential V. The linear
combinations of the latter terms together with g(1) represent
the cross-dependent payoffs for the symmetric three-strategy
games. Here the self-dependent payoff contributions can be
determined by the linear combination of the components g(1),
g(4), and g(5). The payoffs are fixed within the rows of
these components therefore the corresponding contributions
to the potential matrix are equivalent to g(4) + g+(4) and
g(5) + g+(5). Because the components g(6), g(7), and g(8)
are symmetric matrices, their contribution to the potentials are
defined by themselves. The last component, g(9), corresponds
to the well-known rock-scissors-paper (RSP) game. This is the
only component for which the potential does not exist. Thus
the symmetric 3 × 3 game with payoff matrix A is a potential
game, if and only if β(9) = 0. The absence of the potential
for the RSP component is a direct consequence of the fact
that, along the closed trajectory (1,2) → (1,3) → (2,3) →
(2,1) → (3,1) → (3,2) → (1,2) within the two-player strat-
egy profiles, the payoff variation of the strategy-modifying
player is the same (√2/3) for each step that prohibits the
existence of potential [7]. Consequently, potential matrix exist
if β(9) = 0 and its value can be given as
V =
8∑
n=4
β(n)g(n) + β(4)g+(4) + β(5)g+(5). (27)
For an illustration of the decomposition now we consider
the payoff matrix
A =
⎛
⎝0 T σS 1 σ
σ σ σ
⎞
⎠ , (28)
which is introduced for the investigation of the voluntary
prisoner’s dilemma games (T > 1, S < 0, and 0 < σ < 1)
where the three strategies are the defection, cooperation, and
loner declining participation in the game [29–33]. One can
easily evaluate the corresponding coefficients β(n) defined
by Eq. (26). The straightforward calculation gives that all
these coefficients differ from zero. Due to the symmetries,
however, some of these coefficients [e.g., β(3), β(5), β(7), and
β(9)] are independent of σ . Potential does not exist because
β(9) = (S − T )/√6. The quantitative investigations of the
corresponding evolutionary game indicated global oscillations
in the strategy frequencies for mixed populations [34,35] and
self-organizing patterns with rotating spiral arms in the spatial
systems [3]. The observed cyclic dominance among the three
strategies is interpreted as the Red Queen mechanism [36].
Here it is worth mentioning that, among the nonsymmetric
2 × 2 games, the matching pennies component can induce
similar effects [37–39].
V. FEATURES OF THE COMPONENTS
Due to the absence of real individual motivations among
the rational players for the cross-dependent games [A =
β(1)g(1) + β(2)g(2) + β(3)g(3)], all the players choose their
strategy at random if the evolution is governed by the logit rule
(5). Consequently, in these systems the strategies are selected
with equal probability independently of the connectivity
structure and noise level K .
The direct pair interactions are also missing for the
self-dependent components [A(self) = β(1)g(1) + β(4)g(4) +
β(5)g(5)] that can be given as A(self)jk = μj = 13
∑
k Ajk (for
j,k = 1,2,3). Here μj is the average payoff of the first player
if she chooses strategy j whereas her co-player uses a mixed
strategy with selecting the three options with equal probability.
Within the game theory μj quantifies the driving force of risk
dominance introduced by Harsanyi and Selten [40]. At the
same time, in the terminology of three-state Potts μj represents
the external field favoring or suppressing the presence of the
j th state. If A = A(self) then each player chooses the j th
strategy with a frequency
ρj = e
zμj /K∑
l e
zμj /K
, (29)
where z denotes the number of neighbors for regular connec-
tivity structures. Evidently, all the players choose their best
choice in the limit K → 0.
In the literature of physics the models with the last two types
of games are also well investigated because g(8) represents the
three-strategy coordination game or the Potts model [19] that
are already investigated in the presence of external magnetic
fields [g(4) and g(5)] or a RSP component [g(9)] [3,41]. The
three-state Potts model describes an order disorder transition
if the noise level K is increased. At low noise the system
evolves into a state dominated by one of the three strategies
with some isolated point defects. The increase of K results in
more frequent and larger defects inside the ordered structure
and above a threshold value (K > Kc) all the three strategies
are present with the same frequency in the stationary state.
The resultant transition is usually quantified by evaluating
frequencies ρj (j = 1,2,3) as a function of K as it is illustrated
in Fig. 1.
The plotted critical transition represents a universal behav-
ior in systems that belong to a universality class named after
the three-state Potts model. For one of the possible ordered
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FIG. 1. Average frequencies of strategies are illustrated by solid
lines as a function K for the Potts model in the absence of external
field [A = g(8)]. Dashed lines show the same quantities if A = g(8) +
εg(4) for ε = 0.01.
states the K dependence of the strategy frequencies can be
given by a single parameter as
ρ1(K) = ρ2(K) = 13 − γ (K), (30)
ρ3(K) = 13 + 2γ (K),
where γ (K) = 0 if K > Kc, γ (K) = 1/3 if K → 0, and it
vanishes algebraically [γ (K) ∝ (Kc − K)1/9] if K approaches
Kc from below. The other two possible states at low noise can
be obtained by cyclic permutation of the strategy labels.
The general and universal features of this transition and also
the accompanying phenomena are well described in a review of
Potts model [17] and textbooks [42–44] of statistical physics.
Now we illustrate only that this critical transition is smoothed
out for the application of a suitable external field as these
results serve as references for the discussion of other models.
The plotted strategy frequencies ρi in Fig. 1 are obtained
by Monte Carlo simulations for sufficiently large sizes and
long sampling times providing small statistical errors that are
comparable to the line thickness in Fig. 1.
Figure 1 compares typical variations in the strategy frequen-
cies versus K if A = g(8) + β(4)g(4) [β(4)  0]. Evidently
the plotted curves tend towards the results of Potts model if
β(4) → +0. In the latter case the third strategy is preferred
by the positive term of g(4) whereas the others are suppressed
equally. With a suitable choice of the coefficients β(1), β(4),
and β(5) one can tune these preferences separately for each
player.
In the absence of the external field(s) or self-dependent
components [g(4) = g(5) = 0] a domain growing process can
be observed at low noise level if the system is started from a
random initial state. In that case the interfaces separating the
three domains move randomly with a zero average invasion
velocity. In the presence of external fields the preferred
domains invade the territories of others with an average
velocity proportional to the difference in strength of the driving
fields. Due the latter phenomena the system develops into a
mono-domain state of the preferred strategy.
FIG. 2. (Color online) Typical snapshot of self-organizing strat-
egy distributions on a square lattice for a three-strategy model
where the pair interaction is described by A = g(8) + β(9)g(9) for
β(9) = 0.1 at a low noise level (K = 0.3).
Basically different behaviors can be observed when the
rock-scissors-paper [g(9)] component disturbs the domain
growing process. Namely, for β(8) = 1 and |β(9)|  1 the
three homogeneous domains invade cyclically each other
with an average velocity proportional to β(9) at low noise.
These cyclical invasions block the domain growing process
and finally the system evolves into a self-organizing pattern
with rotating spirals around the vertices where three types of
interfaces meet, as it is illustrated in Fig. 2. More precisely, one
can distinguish two types of rotating vertices, called vortices
and antivortices, that rotate clockwise and anticlockwise for
β(9) > 0. Evidently, the direction of rotation is reversed
simultaneously for both types of vortices if the sign of β(9)
is reversed. Similar rotating spirals are observed in many
three-strategy models for different dynamical rules (for a brief
survey see Ref. [3] with further references therein).
The above decomposition implies that the appearance of
this type of self-organizing pattern is strongly related to
the presence of the RSP component [β(9) = 0]. Previous
investigations have quantified that the correlation length and
the average distance between the vertices and antivertices
diverge if the driving force vanishes [β(9) → 0] independently
of the presence and absence of the (attractive) Potts-type
interactions [45–47].
The rest of the nine components are discussed separately
in the following sections because the resultant states require a
more complex characterization.
VI. COORDINATIONS
First we briefly study the component g(6), which can be
transformed into g(8) by exchanging the first and second
rows of the matrix. Similar transformation is used to justify
the equivalence between the behavior of the ferromagnetic
042811-5
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Snapshots illustrate typical strategy distri-
butions during the domain growing process on a square lattice at a
low noise level if the interaction is described by g(8) (left) and g(6)
(right). For both cases the finite system evolves into a mono-domain
state dominated by one of the three ordered strategy arrangements.
and antiferromagnetic Ising models in the absence of an
external magnetic field. The quantification of the mentioned
equivalence requires the division of the lattice into two
identical sublattices (denoted ν = 1 and 2) that in the present
square lattice can be done on the analogy of the black and white
boxes of the chessboard. In that case the stationary states of
these systems can be characterized by ρ(ν)j (K) denoting the
average frequency of the j th strategy as a function of K in the
sublattice ν.
The peculiarity of the possible states of the system for
A = g(6) at low noise levels is illustrated in Fig. 3 where a
typical strategy distribution is shown in the course of domain
growing at time t = 5000 MCS. In that case the systems
are started from a random initial state for both types of
interactions. The right-hand snapshot illustrates the formation
of three domains. The homogeneous domain is formed by
strategy 3 whereas the second and third ones correspond to
chessboard and antichessboard arrangements of the strategies
1 and 2. The interfaces separating the three domains move in
the same way as it observed for the three-state Potts model.
For the sake of comparison the left-hand snapshot shows the
strategy distribution for the three-state Potts model A = g(8)
at the same time, size, and noise level. The reader can easily
recognize that the right-hand pattern becomes similar to the
left-hand one if the black and white colors are exchanged
within one of the sublattices. For any finite sizes after a
sufficiently long transient time the system evolves into a state
where one of the three ordered strategy arrangements prevails
the whole system as it happens for the Potts model, too.
If the homogeneous phase is realized for A = g(6) then
the strategy frequencies are equivalent in both sublattices for
K < Kc; that is,
ρ
(ν)
1 (K) = ρ(ν)2 (K) = 13 − γ (K),
ρ
(ν)
3 (K) = 13 + 2γ (K), (31)
where ν = 1,2 and the value of γ (K) is the same obtained for
the Potts model [see Ref. (30)]. Besides it, this system has two
additional (equivalent) solutions at low noise levels; namely,
ρ
(2)
1 (K) = ρ(1)2 (K) = 13 − γ (K),
ρ
(1)
3 (K) = ρ(2)3 (K) = 13 − γ (K), (32)
ρ
(1)
1 (K) = ρ(2)2 (K) = 13 + 2γ (K),
and the third solution can be given by exchanging the sublattice
indices in Eqs. (32). Equation (31) is the solution that contains
only strategy 3 for K → 0, while Eq. (32) and its counterpart
converge when K → 0 to chessboard and antichessboard
arrangements of strategies 1 and 2 with no presence of
strategy 3.
One can easily recognize that there exist two further
systems possessing similar set of solutions. The common
features of these systems are the existence of three equivalent
solutions at the low-noise limit. One of these solutions is the
homogeneous strategy distribution whereas there exist two
equivalent chessboard- and antichessboard-like arrangements
formed by the second and third strategies as illustrated
in the right-hand snapshot of Fig. 3. Straightforward cal-
culations give that the corresponding two games can be
expressed as
−1
2
g(6) +
√
3
2
g(7) = 1√
18
⎛
⎝ 2 −1 −1−1 −1 2
−1 2 −1
⎞
⎠ (33)
and
−1
2
g(6) −
√
3
2
g(7) = 1√
18
⎛
⎝−1 −1 2−1 2 −1
2 −1 −1
⎞
⎠ . (34)
Accordingly, the family of the three-state Potts models is
represented by four payoff matrices defined by g(8), g(6), and
the expressions (33) and (34). These payoff matrices have
some common features. Namely, all of these matrices are
symmetric and the elements of matrices are defined by one
of the two possible values. In general the maximum value
of the potential matrix is achieved for the Nash equilibrium.
Here there are three equivalent maximum values (one for each
column and row) and the corresponding j and k indices of
the maxima can be considered as three strict Nash equilibria
for the given two-player game. In the light of the above
results the vector space spanned by g(6) and g(7) contains
blends of coordination and anticoordination. Within this
space, there are three equivalent games—represented by g(6)
and Eqs. (33) and (34)—in which one strategy prefers to
coordinate itself and the other two prefer to anticoordinate with
each other.
In fact, these four models represent similar types of possible
situations. Within the terminology of game theory all these
systems can be interpreted as coordination games if the players
use suitable strategy labels.
Three of these models are located within a two-dimensional
subspace spanned by g(6) and g(7) and denoted by closed
circles in Fig. 4. As this subspace has some other curiosity
therefore now we study the models
A = cos(ϕ)g(6) + sin(ϕ)g(7), (35)
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β(6)
β(7)
FIG. 4. Games defined by Eq. (35) are located along the dashed
line in the two-dimensional subspace of parameters. Closed circles
represent games related closely to the attractive Potts model. Open
circles illustrate models equivalent to the repulsive three-state Potts
model. Open squares show six models that can be transformed into
g(6) by the permutation of the strategy labels.
which are identified by the value of ϕ. For ϕ = 0 or π/2
the game is equivalent to g(6) or g(7). These games have a
common feature. Namely, all of these games have three strict
Nash equilibria with equivalent payoffs and potential values
(excepting the models indicated by open circles in Fig. 4) as the
model given by the payoff matrix (34). Consequently, similar
behavior is expected at low noise levels as demonstrated
by the K dependence of the strategy frequencies within the
sublattices. Contrary to the above-mentioned members of the
Potts model family, here quantities ρ(ν)j (K) are characterized
by two distinct parameters: γ1(K) and γ2(K). For example,
one of the possible three equivalent solutions for A = g(7) can
be given as
ρ
(1)
1 (K) = ρ(2)1 (K) = 13 − γ1(K),
ρ
(1)
2 (K) = ρ(2)2 (K) = 13 + γ1(K) + γ2(K), (36)
ρ
(1)
3 (K) = ρ(2)3 (K) = 13 − γ2(K),
where γ1(K) = γ2(K) = 0 if K > Kc, γ1(K) = γ2(K) = 1/3
if K → 0 in analogy with the Potts model where these two
parameters coincide and the value of Kc depends on ϕ. The
latter expressions define the state when only strategy 2 takes
place on the square lattice in the limit K → 0 whereas the
minor strategies are present with different frequencies at low
noise, as illustrated in Fig. 5.
In this model, however, there are two equivalent states with
chessboard-like arrangements of the strategies 1 and 3. For one
of these solutions the strategy frequencies in the sublattices can
be expressed by the same two parameters as
ρ
(1)
1 (K) = ρ(2)3 (K) = 13 + γ1(K) + γ2(K),
ρ
(1)
2 (K) = ρ(2)2 (K) = 13 − γ2(K), (37)
ρ
(1)
3 (K) = ρ(2)1 (K) = 13 − γ1(K),
and the third solution can be obtained by exchanging the
sublattice indices.
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FIG. 5. Average strategy frequencies in the sublattices as a
function of K for the interactions defined by Eq. (35). Solid, dashed,
and dotted lines show the MC results for ϕ = 0, π/6, and π/4,
respectively.
The numerical results in Fig. 5 are obtained from simula-
tions started from one of the ordered states at a low noise level.
After a suitable thermalization time, the average frequencies
are determined over a sampling time. Subsequently, the noise
level is increased and both the thermalization and sampling
are repeated as before. MC data obtained when starting the
simulations from a different ordered state confirm the results
summarized in Eqs. (36) and (37).
There are several basic features that make this system
similar to those defined by g(6) or Eqs. (33) or (34). Namely,
the common features are the similar symmetries and the
presence of three maximum values (strict Nash equilibria) that
are located along the antidiagonal [as well as for Eq. (34)]. On
the other hand, the payoff matrix (or potential) g(7) has three
different elements (−1,0, and +1) that are located parallel with
the antidiagonal. As a result, one can create five additional
equivalent systems with a payoff matrix obtained from g(7)
by permutating the rows and columns simultaneously. These
equivalent games are located within the plane spanned by
g(6) and g(7) and are illustrated by six open boxes in Fig.
4. Interestingly, this subset is closed under multiplying the
payoff matrices by −1. The striking consequence of this
additional symmetry is illustrated in Fig. 6. At first glance
FIG. 6. (Color online) Typical snapshots illustrating strategy dis-
tributions during the domain growing process at a low noise level if
the interactions are given by (left) g(7) and (right) −g(7).
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FIG. 7. Log-log plot of γ1 and γ2 versus Kc − K for ϕ = 0
[crosses, here γ1 = γ2, and Kc = 0.9952 (1)], π/6 [open and closed
circles, for Kc = 0.589 66 (2)], and π/4 [open and closed boxes, for
Kc = 0.4467 (1)]. The dashed line refers to the theoretical prediction
(with a slope of 1/9) for the Potts model.
these snapshots are similar to those plotted on the right side
of Fig. 3 as one can distinguish one homogeneous and two
chessboard-like strategy arrangements within the three types
of growing domains. It can be recognized, however, that all of
these ordered structures are decorated by two types of point
defects appearing with different frequencies quantified by the
parameters γ1(K) and γ2(K) in the expressions (31) and (32).
According to our preliminary results both of these quantities
decrease algebraically if K goes to a critical value Kc.
Figure 7 illustrates the power-law behavior of γ1(K)
and γ2(K) when approaching the critical noise level Kc
for three values of ϕ characterizing the models within the
this two-dimensional subspace. The plotted MC results are
consistent with the expectations predicting γ1(K),γ2(K) ∝
(Kc − K)1/9 if |Kc − K|  Kc. This behavior is characteristic
of the universality class named after the three-state Potts
model where the ordering process is described by only a
one-dimensional order parameter [γ1(K) = γ2(K)] [19,48].
Finally we briefly discuss the systems that are equivalent
to −g(6) and denoted by open circles in Fig. 4. In agreement
with the previous discussions these interactions are related to
the repulsive three-state Potts model that is not capable to
form long-range ordered strategy arrangements on a square
lattice at low noise [19,49]. The absence of ordered strategy
arrangements is related to the frustration studied well in
the literature of statistical physics [50]. Here the frustration
is indicated by the absence of strict Nash equilibria. More
precisely, the present payoff (or potential) matrices have six
equivalent maxima but none of them are strict Nash equilibria.
For the corresponding strategy profiles, however, one of the
players can deviate without reducing its own payoff, leading
to the appearance of frustration.
VII. SUMMARY
For the multi-agent spatial evolutionary games the symmet-
ric pair interactions are generally defined by Q × Q payoff
matrices that can be considered as Q2-dimensional vectors. It
turns out that these interactions can be constructed as a sum
of orthonormal basis vectors (with suitable coefficients) that
are represented by the two-dimensional Fourier components
of the payoff matrix. The systematic analysis of these Fourier
components forQ = 2 and 3 has allowed us to identify relevant
and irrelevant terms within the pair interactions. For example,
Q of Q2 terms (called cross-dependent components) do not
influence the players’ decision if they wish improve their own
payoffs independently of others. If the payoffs or interactions
involve only these terms then the players choose their strategy
at random for the sequential myopic strategy updates, which
happens for the logit rule. Furthermore, there are Q terms
for which the payoff depends only on one’s own strategy. For
games containing only these terms, all players independently
reach their own optimum payoff in the low-noise limit.
Real pair interactions are realized for the coordination-type
components that favor the choice of the same or different
strategies depending on the sign of the corresponding coeffi-
cients. Within this subset of games the exchange of strategy
labels for one of the players will not modify the essence of
coordination. In the case of two strategies, such coordination
and anticoordination games are equivalent to the Ising model
with ferromagnetic and antiferromagnetic interactions [17].
For the three-strategy games this type of equivalence is
extended due to the larger number of possible exchanges
in the strategy labels. As a result, we have found three
additional games or interactions that yield behavior similar
to that described by the three-state Potts model that realizes
one of the three equivalent ordered strategy arrangements at
low-noise levels. Interestingly, for a suitable combination of
the latter games the spatial evolutionary games (with logit
dynamical rule) exhibit an order-disorder phase transition
when varying the noise level. Due to the difference in the
frequency of the minor strategies the phase transition can be
quantified by a two-dimensional order parameter that vanishes
algebraically when approaching the critical transition point(s).
The latter systems can extend the family of models belonging
to universality class of the three-state Potts model.
It is found that one of the nine Fourier components is
identical to the rock-scissors-paper (RSP) game and in the
absence of the RSP component the game is a potential game.
Thus the evaluation of the corresponding coefficient [β(9)]
gives us a simple way to determine whether a symmetric 3
game is a potential game or not.
The Fourier decomposition represents a matrix in a way
that highlights certain symmetries that can be exploited in the
analysis of spatial evolutionary games. This decomposition
may also be useful for other types of interactions characterized
by a matrix, e.g., population dynamics of ecological systems
[41,51]. On the other hand, there may be other matrix
decompositions that better reflect the relevant symmetries of
the systems.
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